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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, government officials in Flint, Michigan, which had been
placed under state-appointed emergency management following a long-
standing budget crisis, imposed a variety of cost-cutting measures. One of
these measures included switching the city's water supply temporarily to the
Flint River. Another decision was made not to spend scarce dollars on treat-
ing the water with anti-corrosion agents. The result was a severe erosion of
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decades-old water pipes, poisoning the water supply with elevated lead
levels, and causing one of the worst public health crises in decades.
The crisis in Flint is indicative of a national problem of declining access
to clean and safe water resources.' But the water crisis also offers a window
into the wider battles over economic, racial, environmental, and urban jus-
tice today. This paper uses our current debates about water equity as an
example of a broader pattern of infrastructural exclusion-the way in which
inequality and exclusion is produced through systems of public and private
governance that operate to restrict access to foundational, infrastructural
goods and services that make human flourishing and membership in the pol-
ity possible.
Concern about economic inequality has become widespread in recent
years.' These anxieties have dovetailed with a revival of interest in the politi-
cal economy of the city, highlighting in particular the ways in which eco-
nomic and racial injustice are produced through the ways cities are
structured by geography, urban planning, financial investment, and public
policy.3 But as this paper-and the broader water crisis in America-sug-
gest, inequality is not just about income. Nor is discrimination and exclusion
about individualized cases of bias or mistreatment. Rather, both inequality
and exclusion are often the products of deeper structural factors: the ways in
which law and public policy systematically allocate well-being. The struc-
tural dimensions of racial and economic inequality have been long-standing
themes in critical race studies, environmental justice, and sociological ac-
counts of stratification.4 But focusing on foundational necessities and infra-
structure like water highlights how the infrastructure and provision of basic
goods is an especially critical front-line where systemic inequality is pro-
duced-and where it must be contested.
Water is a useful case study for infrastructural exclusion, and not just
because of the vital importance of water to human life and communal well-
being. The infrastructural nature of water and its provision has always been
understood as a matter of public policy, politics, and morality. By exploring
how infrastructure can produce exclusion-or inclusion-this paper aims to
develop ideas that can extend to other kinds of infrastructure beyond the
water crisis.'
Specifically, the paper makes three arguments. First, the paper argues
that infrastructural exclusion arises out of a variety of strategies and systems
See Section I.A, infra.
2 See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETrY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2016).
1 See, e.g., RICHARD SCHRAOOER, CITY POWER (2016); DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITrES:
FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY TO THE URBAN REVOLUTION (2012).
4 See generally ANDREA FLYNN ET AL, THE HIDDEN RULES OF RACE (2017)
1 Several scholars including myself have turned to this idea of infrastructure as a broader
concept to help analyze inequality and exclusion. For a recent example and accompanying
citations to the larger literature, see Rahman, Private Power: Public Values: Regulating Social
Infrastructure in a Changing Economy, CARDOZO L. REv., forthcoming (2018) [hereinafter
Private Power: Public Values].
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beyond the immediate actions of the water utility or service provider itself
(Part I). In particular, state institutions can produce exclusion through lax,
captured, or overly exclusionary governance of infrastructure, for example
failing to adequately regulate water quality or raising water fees too high.
Localities can also produce exclusion through more subtle means: seceding
from larger municipalities to restrict the "public" that is owed access to
shared resources, or creating special districts and administrative regimes that
might be more efficient in some ways, but also less accountable in others.
Exclusion can also be produced through private actors, and through the rela-
tionship between public and private actors. Each of these forms of exclusion
are at play in the water crisis, and arguably in most other kinds of infrastruc-
ture or public goods. This in turn suggests that assuring equitable access to
core infrastructure requires a more dynamic look at the ecosystem of public
and private actors that exercise varying degrees of power and control over
infrastructure itself.
Second, the paper suggests that the central problem around infrastruc-
ture is not just one of access to the good; more fundamentally, it is a prob-
lem of power (Part II). By virtue of the critical importance of water (or any
other infrastructural good) to users, whoever controls the terms of access to
or provision of the good exercises tremendous power over those users and
makes them vulnerable to the will of the provider. Viewed through the lens
of power, assuring access to infrastructure is as much a governance prob-
lem-of assuring adequate contestation and checks and balances of such
infrastructural power-as it is a traditional policy question of budgets, fund-
ing levels, and mandates.
Third, having highlighted the hidden techniques of infrastructural ex-
clusion in Part I and the conceptual approach of highlighting the problems of
power and contestability in Part II, the paper than sketches some preliminary
ideas for what an inclusive approach to governing infrastructure might look
like (Part III). Understanding infrastructure in this moral and political sense
suggests that assuring access and equity in context of infrastructure requires
more than simply regulating prices and physical access. Rather, it requires
diagnosing and reworking the systems of power and control which comprise
the governance regime for the infrastructural good itself. Here too the water
context is both central for its importance and illustrative of applications to
other types of infrastructural, natural resource, or public good contexts.
The paper concludes by connecting these ideas of infrastructural exclu-
sion and inclusion to the wider debates under way about urban inequality,
the fight for the city, and the attempts by social movements today to address
structural economic and racial inequalities in 21st-century American capital-
ism (Part IV). In short, this paper suggests that in order to succeed, these
battles for economic and racial inclusion in the face of systemic inequalities
must be focused on questions of infrastructure and the ways in which law
and institutions produce subtle forms of inequality in access to basic needs.
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I. INFRASTRUCTURAL EXCLUSION
A. The Flint water crisis
Like many economically-struggling cities, Flint, Michigan has faced a
long-running problem of deindustrialization, economic decline, and budget
shortfalls pushing the city to the edge of bankruptcy. In 2011, the state of
Michigan appointed an emergency manager to take control of the city and its
operations.6 Emergency managers serve for an indefinite amount of time and
are granted broad powers to displace locally elected officials, privatize gov-
ernment services, sell public assets, and break, negotiate, or enter into agree-
ments on behalf of the municipality.
7
In April 2013, the emergency management leadership of Flint departed
from its previous arrangements with the Detroit Water and Sewerage Depart-
ment (DWSD), instead agreeing to source its water from a newly established
regional water authority.8 In the interim, Flint leadership chose to draw
water on a temporary basis from the Flint River. As a cost-saving measure,
this water was not treated with anti-corrosion agents.9 As a result, the lead
pipes that comprise Flint's aging water system began to erode, causing a
spike in lead levels in the water.10 Lead exposure has severe long-term health
consequences, including potentially severe cognitive impairment, most sig-
nificantly for children and infants consuming the tainted water."
The emergency management was not the only source of failure contrib-
uting to the crisis. For months, the Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) insisted the water was safe. But later scrutiny indicates that
DEQ's methodology of lead testing tended to test homes that were more
modern and less likely to have lead pipes, an unrepresentative sampling
leading the agency to erroneously pronounce the water lead-free."2
6 An emergency manager was appointed to oversee Flint, Michigan in November 2011.
Kristen Longley, Emergency Manager Michael Brown Appointed to Lead Flint Through Sec-
ond State Takeover, MICH. LivE (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/
2011/1 1/emergencymanager michaelbrow.html [https://perma.cc/6T58-2S26].
'See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1549(3)(d) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1552
(2017).
8 Merrit Kennedy, Lead-Laced Water in Flint: A Step-By-Step Look at the Makings of a
Crisis, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/20/465545378/
lead-laced-water-in-flint-a-step-by-step-look-at-the-makings-of-a-crisis [https://perma.cc/
N4JT-G8EY]; see also Nikhil Anand, The Banality of Infrastructure, Soc. Sci. RESEARCH
CouNcL (June 27, 2017), http://items.ssrc.org/the-banality-of-infrastructure/ [https://perma
.cc/E8GL-YJH2].
9 Kennedy, supra note 8; see also Anand, supra note 8.
10 Kennedy, supra note 8; see also Anand, supra note 8.
See, e.g., Libby Nelson, The Flint Water Crisis, Explained, Vox (Feb. 15, 2016), https://
www.vox.com/2016/2/15/10991626/flint-water-crisis [https://perma.cc/2RF3-LSYA];
Samantha Raphelson, Flint Residents Confront Long-term Health Issues After Lead Exposure,
NPR (Oct. 31, 2017) https://www.npr.org/2017/10/31/561155244/flint-residents-confront-
long-term-health-issues-after-lead-exposure [https://perma.cc/94D6-7YE7].
12 Anand, supra note 8; see also Anna Maria Barry-Jester, What Went Wrong in Flint,
FrVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 26, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-went-wrong-in-
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While the crisis in Flint is especially tragic, it is not singular. Lead
poisoning through faulty water systems is a problem in other cities as well,
from Detroit to Baltimore. The national water infrastructure as a whole faces
an estimated $1 trillion shortfall in repairs and needed upgrades over the
next twenty years.13 Yet federal funding for infrastructure investments has
declined more than 70 percent in real terms since 1977.14 The Trump admin-
istration recently proposed halting a federal loan program that in the past has
facilitated municipalities' access to financing for such infrastructure
upgrades.15
There is also a widespread water affordability crisis. Water costs are
rising faster than income and inflation,6 and estimates forecast that by 2022
as many as 41 million American households will have to pay unaffordable
water rates of more than 4 percent of area median income.17 This broader
problem of water affordability itself triggers troubling collateral conse-
quences for poor households. For many residents, unpaid water bills can lead
to a risk of foreclosure. In May 2017, for example, Flint itself-even under a
new city government primarily focused on the water crisis-put 8,000 re-
sidents on notice that their unpaid bills would soon be transferred to tax
liens, beginning a process that could result in foreclosure for those residents
by the spring of 2018.18 While Flint's City Council approved a one-year mor-
atorium on water liens, the state-appointed Receivership Transition Advisory
Board rejected it.19 The City of Detroit, which has faced a similar water
quality and affordability crisis, has imposed a controversial water shut-off
policy for delinquent households that ramped up during the city's bank-
ruptcy. Unsurprisingly, as in other domains of city fines and foreclosure
practices, these punitive consequences are disproportionately enforced
against, and concentrated among, poorer communities of color within metro
regions like Detroit or Baltimore.
flint-water-crisis-michigan/ [https://perma.ccVY6U-GR6K] (describing the failures of DEQ's
statistical sampling methodologies leading to a misleadingly normal-seeming lead finding).
13 Elizabeth Douglass, Towns Sell Their Public Water Systems-and Come to Regret It,
WASH. POST (July 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/towns-




16 Sharmila L. Murthy, A New Constitutive Commitment o Water, 36 B.C. J.L. & Soc.
JUST. 159, 165-68 (2016).
17 Sarah Frostenson, America Has a Water Crisis No One Is Talking About, Vox (May 9,
2017), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/5/9/15183330/america-water-crisis-af-
fordability-millions [https://perma.cc/D2CU-6GBD].
"8 See Jacey Fortin, In Flint, Overdue Bills for Unsafe Water Could Lead to Foreclosures,
N.Y. TIMEs (May 4, 2017), https://www.nyimes.com/2017/05/04/us/flint-water-home-foreclo-
sure.tml?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/B59E-QBGC].
19 See Leonard Fleming, Flint Mayor, State Clash Over Tax Liens, DETRorr NEWS (June
27, 2017), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2017/06/27/
flint-tax-lien-mortatorium-rejected/103235524/ [https://perma.cc/8W5X-QBHY].
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This escalation of prices and loss of access is exacerbated by the priva-
tization and financialization of water systems.20 This privatization trend is
further complicated by a related shift toward the financialization of water
systems, where cities turn to Wall Street to finance critical infrastructure
repairs in exchange for guaranteed return for investors. This results in simi-
lar increases in prices for users. In some towns like Bayonne, New Jersey, a
deal with private equity firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts financed water up-
grades but led to a 28 percent price hike, generating double-digit returns for
investors-all while households fell behind in bills and liens on houses trip-
led.21 In the Bayonne case, the city had meant to oversee the private equity
firm's role in funding water upgrades, but ultimately had to shutter its own
oversight office for a lack of resources and staff. Privatization and price
escalation have thus increased exclusion and inequality in access to basic
water services.
B. Mechanisms of infrastructural exclusion
The experience of water contamination in Flint is indicative of a prob-
lem facing water infrastructure more broadly. As Flint highlights, the legal
construction and governance of infrastructure is a crucial site through which
inequality and exclusion is constructed. These inequities are not just a matter
of shut-offs or high prices imposed by service providers. Rather, the above
account suggests four distinct mechanisms through which infrastructure can
generate problematic forms of inequality.
First, infrastructural exclusion can arise through the maladministration
of infrastructure itself, on the part of regulators, utilities, or service provid-
ers. Note how much of the crisis in Flint arose from the unaccountability and
outright failures of public administrators, from the emergency management
system to the inadequacies of Michigan's DEQ. The collateral consequences
arising from failure to pay water bills is part of a larger problem that extends
beyond the water context: how social welfare and social services agencies
operate. Indeed, outside of the water context, there is a rich literature docu-
menting exactly these patterns of bureaucratic exclusion.2  Throughout the
social safety net, racially-charged attacks on beneficiaries portraying recipi-
ents as lazy or undeserving have been codified through state and local condi-
tions on benefits. Similarly, conditioning benefits on strict requirements like
20 See sources cited supra note 8.
21 Danielle Ivory, Ben Protess, & Griff Palmer, In American Towns, Private Profits from
Public Works, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/24/business/
dealbook/private-equity-water.html [https://perma.cc/37RZ-WJ4Z] (reporting 8-18% returns
for investors).22 See, e.g., ANDREA CAMPBELL, TRAPPED IN AMERICA'S SAFETY NET (2014); KATHRYN J.
EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING IN AMERICA 1-34
(2016); MICHAEL KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: AMERICA'S ENDURING CONFRONTATION
WITH POVERTY (1989).
2018] Infrastructural Exclusion and the Fight for the City 539
employment, punitive paperwork, and regular reporting effectively harnesses
the administration of public goods to exclude and restrict.
Second, the legal construction of municipal and special district bounda-
ries can play a role in limiting access by defining the "public" that is enti-
tled to access public infrastructure and public goods, whether it is water,
electricity, or other public goods like schools and parks. As local govern-
ment law scholars have noted, the legal secession of suburbs from urban
cores in the late 20th century was largely driven by backlash against deseg-
regation. Whiter and wealthier localities sought to preserve local control
over property tax revenues and school funding in order to exclude racial
minorities-and avoid sharing tax revenues accordingly.23 In the Flint con-
text, the structural weakness of Flint as a municipality and its dependence on
other entities-from the metropole of Detroit, the state-created water utili-
ties, or the state government itself-shapes much of Flint's inability to pro-
vide adequate access to water and core infrastructure. By fragmenting local
authority and allocating some communities to inferior and under-resourced
water systems, this pattern thus defines who can access what quality of water
services (or other public goods).
Third, exclusion can be facilitated through privatization of public infra-
structure. Decades of conservative calls for fiscal restraint and low taxes-
motivated in part by precisely a reaction against the provision of (desegre-
gated) public goods-has starved state and local governments of much-
needed revenue. This in turn has fueled the push to privatize public goods-
such as the water utility at the heart of the crisis in Flint-as government
agencies facing tight budgets are unable to maintain services. Desperate cit-
ies are scrambling to cut costs or to boost revenues by offloading city ser-
vices to private companies-preferably in exchange for a fee or income
stream from those private managers. Private control of water infrastructure is
a problem globally: multinational corporations like Nestle and Coca-Cola
have concentrated control over water infrastructure in many regions, raising
significant concerns of environmental damage, human rights abuses, and
water contamination and access.24 In the United States, localities facing mu-
nicipal bankruptcy or budget cuts engage in aggressive efforts to shrink their
formal public sector footprint, by cutting services, privatizing, or deregulat-
ing.25 The spread of such privatization over the last few decades has re-
shaped water infrastructure, and other kinds of critical urban infrastructure
23 GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS
181-195 (2001); see also Nancy MacLean, Southern Dominance in Borrowed Language: The
Regional Origins of American Neo-Liberalism, in NEW LANDSCAPES OF INEQUALITY: NE-
OLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 21 (Jane L. Collins et al. eds.,
2008).
24 See, e.g., Karen Bakker, The 'Commons' Versus the 'Commodity': Alter-globalization,
Anti-privatization and the Human Right to Water in the Global South, 39 ANTIPODE 430,
430-55 (2007).
21 See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1157-79
(2014).
540 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 53
and services from transit to parking meters.2 6 Once control over these vital
goods and services has been privatized, end users are often faced with higher
prices and service providers that are more opaque and less open to accounta-
bility. Poorer cities and communities are often hit hardest by these privatiza-
tion efforts, reducing their ability to access and hold accountable these
services.27
Fourth, privatization has increasingly been accompanied by a parallel
process of financialization.2 8 Private equity and other financial investors
have taken over public utilities, promising lower costs and better service.
Water has thus become another securitized, financialized asset.29 Private
water companies like American Water Works or the global French-based
firm Suez are themselves largely owned by water-focused investment funds
operated by the major financial firms of the globe. These funds are incen-
tivized to deliver returns to investors, generating those returns through the
management of water systems.30 Studies of financialization have highlighted
this pattern as a broader trend in the last few decades, raising concerns about
the dominance of shareholder and investor interests converting essential ur-
ban infrastructure-whether in the form of services like water or in real
estate investments-into return-generating investments, with problematic
implications for affordability and public policy.3' The risks of privatization
and financialization for secure access to infrastructure extends to water and
beyond. Studies by racial and economic justice organizations like In the
Public Interest and the Action Center on Race and the Economy document
how this privatization and financialization of formerly public services has
spread like wildfire across state and local governments, including around
water infrastructure.32 The result is higher fees for cities and end users, wors-
ened labor conditions, and eroded services. Consequently, privatized ser-
vices are less secure and reliable. Again, the variations in affordable and
dependable access hit racial minorities and poorer neighborhoods especially
hard.33
26 See IN THE PUB. INTEREST, How PRIVATIZATION INCREASES INEQUALITY 15-19 (Sep.
2016), https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/InthePublicInterest-Inequali-
tyReportSept20l6.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DYE-B2HT]; ACTION CTR. ON RACE & THE ECON.,
https://www.acrecampaigns.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/AS3N-
6A7S].
27 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 25, at 1129-50; IN THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 26.
28 See, e.g., Kate Bayliss, The Financialization of Water, 46 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON.
292, 298-99 (2013).
29 See id. at 300.
3 0 See id. at 294-300.
31 See, e.g., RANA FOROOHAR, MAKERS AND TAKERS: THE RISE OF FINANCE AND THE FALL
OF AMERICAN BUsINEss 210-36 (2016); Gerald Davis & Suntae Kim, Financialization of the
Economy, 41 ANN. REV. Soc.. 203, 213 (2015).
32 See IN THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 26; ACTION CTR. ON RACE & THE ECON., supra
note 26.
" See IN THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 26; see also ACTION CTR. ON RACE & THE
ECON., supra note 27 (providing an example of an organization working to address this issue).
For an excellent example of privatization, financialization, and the corruption of basic city
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These four mechanisms-bureaucratic exclusion, secession, privatiza-
tion, and financialization-are not just passive conditions, but active policy
decisions and tools through which the day-to-day management of infrastruc-
ture can produce systemic exclusion and inequality. These four mechanisms
interact with one another to fuel what we might think of as a "public goods
death spiral."34 The initial pressure to cut public budgets reduces available
government resources and incentivizes the privatization and financialization
of infrastructure. This in turn makes it more likely and possible for private
actors to exploit and extract return through the management of crucial neces-
sities like water. Meanwhile, the emaciation of governmental institutions,
capacities, and personnel makes it ever less likely that these goods can be re-
publicized in the future. Wealthier (and whiter) communities, by contrast,
remain untouched by these pressures, able to both overlook higher fees
and-having seceded from larger metro areas-maintain control over their
higher property values and higher tax revenues.
The water crisis in Flint is indicative of how the legal construction and
governance of water infrastructure, and infrastructure more broadly, can pro-
duce problematic forms of inequality, exclusion, and subordination. The cen-
tral problem here is not just one of budgets and substantive policy; it is also
one of power and accountability. The accountability problem arises in the
context of private actors-like the firms responsible for managing privatized
infrastructure, or the investor interests-as well as public actors, from public
authorities to regulators to zoning and urban planning authorities. As we will
see in the next Part, infrastructure is a particularly stark manifestation of the
problem of disparate, arbitrary power. The challenge for equitable access to
water infrastructure, then, is as much about creating mechanisms of account-
ability as it is about substantive policies around water management and
investment.
II. TOWARD A POLITICAL THEORY OF INFRASTRUCTURE:
POWER, DEMOCRACY, AND THE PUBLIC UTILITY TRADITION
Much of the difficulty arising from the mechanisms of exclusion and
the systemic erosion of water access and equity described in Part I stems
from the reality that water is not just an ordinary commodity to be optimized
and managed cost-effectively. It is also a crucial necessity for human and
infrastructure, see e.g., Danielle Ivory, Ben Protess, & Kitty Bennett, When You Dial 911 and
Wall Street Answers, N.Y. TiMEs (June 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/busi-
ness/dealbook/when-you-dial-911 -and-wall-street-answers.html?rref= collection%2Fseriescol-
lection%2Fprivate-equity-bottom-line-nation&_r=O [https://perma.cc/YF6Z-Z3XP].
"4 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 25, at 1208 ("Public employment, depth of regulation,
and government spending relate to each other dynamically.").
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communal well-being.35 The construction of water infrastructure and infra-
structure more broadly-who gets access to what goods and services on
what terms-in a very real way demarcates the boundaries of membership in
the polity. Water systems are essential to the production and reproduction of
economic inequality and racial subordination.36 Water infrastructure is a cen-
tral site where battles for inclusion and ideals of freedom, democracy, and
equality are made real.37 How then should water infrastructure be governed
to assure equity, access, inclusion, and ultimately, membership? What legal
structures are needed to overcome the mechanisms of exclusion described
above?
In context of infrastructure, scholars and reformers have often turned to
the language of the "commons" both as a way to describe the uniqueness of
certain goods like water, parkland, or other kinds of infrastructure, and as a
normative appeal to motivate the need for regulations that protect against
discrimination and ensure fair and equal access. Thus, where goods are
nonrival and nonexcludable, they might be seen as "common pool re-
sources"-public goods that are best managed collectively to prevent pri-
vate encroachment or appropriation.38 For goods that are infrastructural in a
broader sense-not just roads, bridges, water or electricity, but also informa-
tion, knowledge, and telecommunications-the importance of these goods
motivates a commons-style approach to governance emphasizing nondis-
crimination, common carriage, and equal access.39 The invocation of the idea
of the commons operates as "a social imaginary rather than as a distinct set
of institutional arrangements. " 4 Especially around water and other similar
public resources, reformers today invoke the language of the commons to
motivate opposition to the commodification and privatization of public ser-
" Other goods and services might also be viewed as necessities, which might then warrant
similar scrutiny and protection. This is exactly the implication of a broad view of infrastructure
implied in this Part. For a longer discussion of the potential expansions of infrastructure and
utilities to cover other goods and services, see Private Power: Public Values, supra note 5.
36 See, e.g., NiKimL ANAND, HYDRAULIC CITY: WATER AND THE INFRASTRUCTURES OF Crr-
IZENSHP IN MUMBAI (2017) (discussing how water services is key site for constructing urban
inequality in Mumbai); ANTINA VON SCHNrTZER, DEMOCRACY'S INFRASTRUCTURE: ThCIINO-
PoLmICs AND PROTEST AFTER APARTHEID (2016) (providing case of South African water infra-
structure reaffirming racial hierarchies after the fall of apartheid).
37 See, e.g., Susan Leigh Star, The Ethnography of Infrastructure, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCIEN-
TIST 377 (1999); Colin McFarlane & Jonathan Rutherford, Political Infrastructures: Governing
and Experiencing the Fabric of the City, 32 INTY. J. URB. & REGIONAL REs. 363 (2008);
Malini Ranganathan, The Environment as Freedom: A Decolonial Reimagining, Soc. Sci. RE-
SEARCH CoUNCIL. (July 13, 2017), http://items.ssrc.org/the-environment-as-freedom-a-decoloni
al-reimagining/ [https://perma.cc/34GD-MDMW].
" See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 30-41 (1990).
31 See BRETr FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE 253 (2012) (extending the concept of infra-
structure and the commons to a wide range of goods and services including communications
and knowledge, which all require similar nondiscriminatory open access governance).
40 John Wagner, Water and the Commons Imaginary, 53 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 617,
617 (2012).
[Vol. 53
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vices.41 The invocation of the commons also has another connotation, sug-
gesting the need for specifically democratic governance of these resources.42
This appeal to shared ownership, responsibility, and collaborative govern-
ance can also operate at a larger scale: the city itself, as some scholars have
argued, represents a kind of larger "commons" that ought to be governed
collectively and democratically.43
The notion of the commons is a powerful one. But it leaves much un-
derspecified. What institutional mechanisms do we need to enable this kind
of commons governance? Moreover, the idea of the commons as a strategy,
rather than as an aspiration, is of limited use. The kinds of infrastructural
exclusion mapped in Part I above are not just products of a misconception of
the nature and importance of water; they are the result of existing disparities
of power as well as structural and institutional dynamics shaping the exer-
cise of public and private authority over the water system. Thus, while the
commons-style aspirations for fair and equal access and democratic govern-
ance are the right normative ideals, we need a further understanding of the
dynamics of power and institutions in order to make those ideals real.
The concept of the public utility provides a useful starting point for
shaping these aspirations of the commons into specific institutional and po-
litical regimes. Indeed, ideas of public utility have played a central role in
shaping the law, institutions, and politics around water and other forms of
infrastructure in American law for over a century. While some of the spe-
cific legal institutions and forms arising from public utility reformers have
fallen short, playing a role in the failures described above, the underlying
theory of public utility can help inform the reimagining of water governance
and water infrastructure today.
Starting in the late nineteenth century, and facing the economic and
social upheavals of industrialization, a cohort of legal thinkers, reformers,
and policymakers operating especially at the state and local level developed
the idea of public utility as a way to justify and design new regulatory re-
gimes that would address the problems of inequality and private power in
the new economy. The idea encompassed everything from rate-setting to
public ownership to new forms of regulatory oversight.44 As Novak writes,
41 Wagner, supra note 41, at 621; Sheila Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Com-
mons, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 281, 284 (2016) ("Increasingly, progressive urban reformers
are looking beyond the state (and for that matter the city) to sublocal forms of resistance, and
cooperation, to make claims on urban resources and city space as a 'commons.' These claims
consist not simply of the assertion of a 'right' to a particular resource; rather, they assert the
existence of a common stake or common interest in resources shared with other urban inhabi-
tants as a way of resisting the privatization and/or commodification of those resources. In other
words, the language of the 'commons' is being invoked to lay claim to, and protect against the
threat of 'enclosure' by economic elites, a host of urban resources and goods which might
otherwise be more widely shared by a broader class of city inhabitants.") [citations omitted]
42 OSTROM, supra note 38, at 45-55.
4Foster & Iaione, supra note 41, at 288.
41 William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J.
377, 400 (2010) [hereinafter Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism]. See also
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"progressives viewed the law of public utilities as a vibrant and expansive
arena for experimenting with unprecedented governmental control over busi-
ness, industry, and the market.'45 The idea of public utility thus drove the
creation of the modem regulatory state itself. The central focal point for
public utility reformers was the need to establish public oversight of private
actors who had centralized control over foundational goods and services: not
just core infrastructure like water and transportation and electricity but also
other necessities like milk, ice, banking, and much more. The concerns of
Progressive Era reformers responding to industrialization parallel in many
ways the challenges facing contemporary reformers struggling with
problems of power and access in context of necessities like water.
Take for example the case of Shepard v. The Milwaukee Gas Light
Company,46 in Wisconsin in 1858. Granted a charter from the city to provide
lighting to the town, a private gas company refused service to a store owner
whose shop was already connected to the main gas line in the town. The
Court rejected this denial of service. According to the court, while the com-
pany "has full right to govern itself," it had "no right to govern the people at
large, whether their dwellings happen to be lighted with oil or gas."
'47 The
private company was fully capable of making its own rules and regulations
for conditions of service, but those rules and regulations "must be reasona-
ble, just, lawful, not capricious, arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable. Were
it not so, the whole net work [sic] of pipes and machinery would be at the
mercy of the careless, the fraudulent or the malignant.
'48 This language is
indicative: the gasworks were not just another instance of an unfair contract.
Rather the problem was really one of substituting public governance for pri-
vate governance. By virtue of their control over an infrastructure that was
now crucial for all social and economic life, the gasworks was structurally
positioned to exercise arbitrary unchecked power over end users. By default
it possessed an unfair advantage in negotiations. It was this disparity of
power, more so than the particulars of price or terms of access, that was
most troubling to public utility reformers.
William J. Novak, The Public Utility Idea and the Origins of Modern Business Regulation, in
CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 139 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak
eds., 2017) (describing the history of the public utility idea and how it drove the innovation of
modern administrative governance) [hereinafter The Public Utility Idea]. For an earlier canon-
ical account of the public utility concept as innovated by the influential legal thinker Robert
Hale, see BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND
THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 160-204 (1998). A number of scholars are now
exploring the implications of public utility concepts for other areas of law and policy. See, e.g.,
William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614 (2014);
Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L. REv. 57 (2015); Morgan Ricks,
Money as Infrastructure (draft on file with author), available at https://papers.ssm.com/sol
3 /
papers.cfm?abstractid=3070270 [https://perma.cc/3F8J-SERN]; Private Power: Public Val-
ues, supra note 5.
45 Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism, supra note 45, at 399-400.
46 Shepard v. The Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 6 Wis. 539 (1858).
47 Id. at 542.
48 Id. at 548.
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Another variation of this assertion of public control over infrastruc-
ture-one more analogous to the water problem-can be seen in the con-
temporaneous use of the "public trust" doctrine in the late nineteenth
century. In the classic case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. State of Illi-
nois,49 the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute, the Lake Front Act of
1869, which granted title to the Harbor and adjacent Lake Park in Chicago
(now Millennial Park) to the railroad for use for development of its shipping
and transport system. Even though the conveyance was authorized by the
state itself, and included several restrictions on water and property rights to
ensure access for the public, the Court still found it an impermissible transfer
of an intrinsically public matter-the control of the waterways-to a private
actor. As the Court argued, private use of the waterways "could not be per-
mitted except by license of the crown, which could alone exercise such do-
minion over the waters as would insure freedom in their use so far as
consistent with the public interest."50 The Court based this ruling on a read-
ing of English common law preserving to the Crown the control over seas
and navigable waterways, extending it to freshwater domains like Lake
Michigan. Despite the restrictions on the railroad placed by the Act, the
Court reasoned that to uphold the Act and its conveyance "would sanction
the abdication of the general control of the state" over navigable waters.5
"Such abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which re-
quires the government of the state to preserve such waters for the use of the
public."52 Crucially, the Court seemed to view the Act as a kind of imper-
missible private delegation, a transference of the essential sovereign func-
tions of the public state to the private railroad.53
Following the holdings of cases like Illinois Central, the modem public
trust doctrine is viewed in limited contexts as applying to natural resources
that are interconnected with navigable waters. But the doctrine has also been
used widely to protect both environmental resources and urban spaces like
public squares from private encroachment.5 4 For some property law scholars,
the public trust doctrine is seen in the familiar context of takings jurispru-
dence, emphasizing the need to optimize the economic productivity.5 But as
" Il1. Cent. R.R.Co. v. State of Ill., 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
'0 Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
51 Id. at 452.
52 Id. at 453.
53 As the Court continues:
A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a state has never been ad-
judged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would
be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation. The state can no
more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like
navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and
control of private parties.
Illinois Central, at 453.
5" Foster & Iaione, supra note 41, at 315-6.
5 See Molly Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy,
1789-1920, 1980 Wis. L. Rnv. 1403 (1980).
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Illinois Central suggests, the deeper concern here is like the concern in
Shephard: the fear of private control over infrastructure through which the
private actor can exercise dominion over end users.
56
Indeed, nineteenth-century courts and state legislators drew on common
law concepts of "public callings" and "common carriage" to require such
infrastructural firms to comply with duties of nondiscrimination, providing
their services to all users on fair and equal terms. Beyond courts, state legis-
latures created administrative bodies, which for the first time began to de-
velop systematic forms of public oversight, transparency, enforcement, and
even rate-setting. At the extreme, cities and states converted private utilities
into public authorities, leading to the first municipal authorities for electric-
ity, transportation, water, and more.57 The industrializing economy created a
central challenge for many of these municipal reformers: private actors had
come to control many of these key necessities, exercising a kind of state-like
coercive influence on the public. Yet these private actors were not subject to
any of the checks and balances that, in a constitutional republic, accompany
the exercise of similarly coercive state power.8
As a central human necessity, water was a central locus for these efforts
to counteract private power through new administrative institutions and legal
doctrines. Bruce Wyman, one of the leading Progressive Era legal theorists
of the public utility tradition, noted that it "has been always obvious" that
water "is a public utility in the true sense of the term. '59 Historically, water
was a key domain where public utility ideas led to the creation of state-
created administrative oversight bodies and outright municipalization of the
utility itself.60 State courts deployed the public trust doctrine in part to secure
56 See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly
Doctrine, 44 B.C. ENvTL. AvF. L. REV. 1 (2017). Some scholars have suggested that this
expansive reading of the public trust doctrine is based on a historical error, a misunderstanding
of the ancient common law, and a short-lived and not-very-influential moment in American
legal doctrine. See James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths: A History of the Public
Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (2007). But read in context of the public
utility idea more broadly and the larger politics of the late nineteenth century efforts to create
legal oversight of private power whether through judicial or new administrative means; see
Bayliss, supra note 28; the concern about power seems central regardless of the historical
accuracy of the Court's analysis.
7 See Novak and accompanying citations, supra note 44.
58 For a description of this critique of private power as central to Progressive Era reform-
ers, see Private Power: Public Values, supra note 5, at 9-11. ; see also K. SABEEL RAHmAN,
DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 54-77 (2017) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AGAINST
DOMINATION].
" Bruce Wyman, The Law of The Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17
HiAv. L. REv. 156, 167 (1904).
60 GAIL RADFORD, THE RISE OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY: STATEBUILDING AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 76 (2013). Though private waterworks were
constructed at rapid rates in the early 19th century, and the municipalization of those water
systems began sooner and proceeded more rapidly than in other sectors. See Scott Masten,
Public Utility Ownership in 19th-Century America: The 'Aberrant' Case of Water, 27 J. L.
EcON. & ORG. 604 (2011).
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public control over water sources that in turn fueled these municipal water
utilities.
61
The public utility tradition is in many ways a success story-a series of
doctrinal and administrative-institutional innovations through which nine-
teenth-century reformers asserted public control over, and therefore de-
manded accountability from, the arbitrary private control of water
infrastructure in response to the upheavals and inequities of the industrializ-
ing economy. Yet at the same time, it is also true that the modern experience
of infrastructural exclusion speaks to the failures of those public utility-in-
spired regimes. As noted in Part I above, it was the failure of state regula-
tors, the existing water districts, city planning and zoning powers that helped
contribute to the problem of water inequality in Flint and elsewhere. So what
then can we take from this public utility history and tradition? As William
Boyd suggests, public utility was less about a specific set of institutional
regimes as it was about a "normative effort directed at ensuring that the
governance of essential network industries . .. proceeds in a manner that
protects the public from the abuses of market power," an ethos that repre-
sented "a collective project aimed at harnessing the power of private enter-
prise and directing it toward public ends. '62
The central conceptual innovation of the public utility idea is its empha-
sis on diagnosing the problem of power: by controlling infrastructure and the
terms of access to necessities, entities charged with provision of basic goods
had to be subjected to more stringent forms of accountability and oversight.
Indeed, this concern about quasi-sovereign private power was a broader one
that shaped the larger politics, reform agendas, and legal thought of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century.63 Thus, appeals to concepts like
"public trust," "common carriage," "public utility" were fundamentally
about motivating the creation of checks and balances, catalyzing the innova-
tion of legal and institutional regimes aimed at preventing concentration of
arbitrary power exercised through the control of infrastructure. These ideas
offer a compelling conceptual approach to the problems of structural ine-
quality and disparate access to water and other forms of infrastructure as
described in Part I above.64
III. CONSTRUCTING INCLUSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE: WATER AND BEYOND
The public utility tradition provides some past examples of how law
and institutional design structurally shifted the authority over key infrastruc-
61 Selvin, supra note 55, at 1429-34.
62 Boyd, supra note 44, at 1619.
63 On this private power orientation of Progressive Era political and legal thought, see
DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION, supra note 58, at 54-77.
6 See Ivan Kaplan, Does the Privatisation of Publicly Owned Infrastructure Implicate the
Public Trust Doctrine? Illinois Central and the Chicago Parking Meter Concession Agree-
ment, 7 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 136, 138-40 (2012) (noting the potential radicalism of public
trust doctrine in an era of municipal privatization).
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tural goods like water away from private hands and placed them in public
institutions that, in theory, were more accountable and public-spirited. The
public utility tradition itself suggests that the response must be an attempt to
reinvent mechanisms of public, democratic oversight and accountability that
is capable of addressing the modem loci of power over key infrastructure
like water. Despite the very real failures of public (and private) actors con-
tributing to the water crisis today-as Part I suggests, infrastructural exclu-
sion today in some ways originates from the failures of the bodies
constructed in the public utility tradition-the public utility ethos offers us a
way to conceptualize a response to the kinds of structural exclusions mapped
in Part I above. Specifically, it suggests the need to build institutional checks
and balances responsive to concentrations of arbitrary power over
infrastructure.
After first reviewing the current patchwork of legal proposals and struc-
tures around water equity, this Part suggests two further areas for legal inno-
vation and reform. Drawing from the public utility tradition, equitable water
infrastructure requires more than legal mandates for water access. It also
requires new public institutions that have first the authority to address the
kinds of exclusionary mechanisms mapped in Part I above, and second ac-
countability systems to ensure that this oversight authority is used
effectively.
A. Mandating water equity
In the aftermath of the Flint crisis, state legislators, legal advocacy
groups, and scholars have proposed a number of legal remedies. A court
order in November 2016 required the city to deliver bottled water to re-
sidents.65 A class action lawsuit led by the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People ("NAACP") to challenge the water poisoning,
as well as an American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") suit alleging viola-
tions of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act,66 and criminal charges against
former Flint public officials are already under way.
67 To achieve a more sys-
temic protection of equal access to water, scholars and activists have pro-
65 Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 217 F.Supp.3d 960, 980 (E.D. Mich. Nov.
10, 2016); see also Paul Egan, Federal Judge Orders Delivery of Bottled Water in Flint, DE-
TROrr FREE PRESS (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-
water-crisis/2016/1 1/10/delivery-bottled-water-flint/93613760/ [https://perma.cc/A5TP-
RYE4].
66 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1974). The Act authorizes the EPA to set standards for all
public water systems to ensure their safety for drinking and consumption, considering risks
and potential costs.
67 Complaint, Gilcreast v. Lockwood, No. 2:16-cv-11173, 2016 WL 1258320 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 31, 2016); Complaint, Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 217 F.Supp.3d 960
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 27, 2016); see also Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, 2 Former Flint Emergency
Managers Charged Over Tainted Water, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/2016/12/20/us/flint-water-charges.htmIl [https://perma.cc/YJX7-E667] (describing crimi-
nal charges brought against former Flint emergency managers).
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posed i range of statutory and constitutional rights claims aimed at
bolstering the legal status of the right to water. But the need to create admin-
istrative and governance institutions capable of implementing and enforcing
these legal standards presents a central challenge to city and state leadership.
In international human rights law, the essential nature of water has fu-
eled a push for viewing water as a foundational human right.68 Yet a consti-
tutional protection for access to water has not gained much purchase in
American constitutional doctrine. While some scholars have argued for Due
Process and Equal Protection defenses of a right to water, courts have for the
most part been unwilling to follow this route-including in the case of ac-
cess-to-water battles in present-day Michigan.69 Despite legal challenges to
water shutoffs, affordability, and contamination in Detroit and Flint, courts
have held that there is no affirmative right to water in these cases.70 One way
to understand this hesitancy is to see the right to water, like other socioeco-
nomic rights, as implicating complex budgetary and public policy questions
of the sort that courts are uncomfortable interfering with. As with other so-
cioeconomic rights, then, the primary action for assuring legal access to
water has moved from the constitutional to the statutory realm.7
Statutory and regulatory measures can attempt to codify a "right to
water" through a combination of legal mandates and protections.7 2 At the
federal level, relevant provisions include the Clean Water Act and the Safe
68 The United Nations General Assembly affirmed in 2010 an international right to water.
See G.A. Res. 64/292 (July 10, 2010). For a discussion of the international right to water and
its limits in the US context, see Murthy, supra note 16, at 205-07. See also Rhett Larson, The
New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2187-89 (2013).
'9 See In re City of Detroit, 841 F.3d 684, 699-700 (6th Cir. 2016), affirming in part a
lower court ruling, including the lower court's view that there is no constitutional or fundamen-
tal right to water service. For a survey of constitutional cases on access to water, see Murthy,
supra note 16, at 188-200. See also Larson, supra note 68, at 2241-42, 2259.
70 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 841 F.3d at 700 ("This is the case for plaintiffs' alleged
property right to continued water service-or continued affordable water service. A right of
this nature is not rooted in our nation's traditions or implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.").
7' Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-form Versus
Weak-form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 I-CoN 391, 406-08 (2007). Whether or not such
judicialized and constitutionalized review of socioeconomic rights does in fact increase on-the-
ground access to basic necessities is a matter of some dispute. Some scholars have suggested
that it does little to actually change the level of funding and public investment in basic goods.
See, e.g., Adam Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Rights Without Resources: The Impact of Constitu-
tional Social Rights on Social Spending, COASE-SANDOR WORKING PAPER SERIES IN LAW AND
EcONOMICS, 5-6 (2016).
72 In California, advocacy groups have offered different frameworks that they argue
should drive state agencies' interpretation and implementation of the statutory right to water.
The Community Water Center in Central California has argued that state agencies should inter-
pret the statutory right to water to be comprised of distinct dimensions such as affordability
and nondiscrimination and participation. See, e.g., Rose Francis & Laurel Firestone, Imple-
menting the Human Right to Water in California's Central Valley: Building a Democratic
Voice Through Community Engagement in Water Policy Decision Making, 47 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 495, 513-18 (2011). For another different, but overlapping, breakdown, see U.C. BERKE-
LEY INTL HUM. RTS. L. CLINIC, TiE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER BILL IN CALIFORNIA: AN IM-
PLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK FOR STATE AGENCIES 67 (2013).
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Drinking Water Act, which provide for minimum federal standards for water
quality, as well as civil rights laws that might extend to require nondiscrimi-
natory access to public services such as water.7 3 Other statutory and adminis-
trative systems address further dimensions of the problem of water provision
and access.7 4 As Martha Davis suggests, civil rights laws might provide an
"alternative legal infrastructure to ensure baseline water and sanitation
equality-that is, equal access to levels of water necessary to meet minimum
daily needs."75 Civil rights statutes could address the racialized impact of
water disparities, for example through disparate impact claims under the Fair
Housing Act, to address discrimination in service provision and facilities to
a dwelling.7 6 Other civil rights statutes, like the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
§ 504, or Title II of the ADA, include provisions applying to dwellings that
could be applied to issues of water access and safety.77 But these statutes all
depend on a robust administrative regime to be enforced and implemented
effectively-and enforcing these provisions in the water context would re-
quire a similarly active and creative enforcement approach.
71
State governments have attempted to codify their own version of water
rights. While there is a complex legal regime governs the allocation of
groundwater rights, riparian and property rights, and drought water limits,
California has also experimented with an affirmative right to water access.
In 2012, California enacted a Human Right to Water bill that calls on "all
relevant state agencies" to pursue the policy goal that "every human being
has the right to safe, clean, affordable, and accessible water adequate for
human consumption, cooking, and sanitary purposes.' 79 But even here, the
statutory provision explicitly states that it does not "expand any obligation
of the state to provide water or to require the expenditure of additional re-
sources to develop water infrastructure."80 To the extent that this provision
has had an impact, it has been through an informal shift in how state-level
regulatory agencies approach their planning, regulation, and further develop-
ment of the state's water infrastructure, for example by engaging in addi-
7' For an overview of various statutory and regulatory tools for access to water, see
Martha Davis, Let Justice Roll Down: A Case Study of the Legal Infrastructure for Water
Equality and Affordability, 23 GEo. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'v 355, 366-85 (2016); Derrick
Howard, The Appearance of Solidity: Legal implementation of the Human Right to Water in
the United States, 11 APPALACHIAN J.L. 123, 134 (2011); Larson, supra note 68, at 2258;
Murthy, supra note 16, at 206.
71 See Davis, supra note 73, at 363-64; Justin Lee, Information Drought: Bringing Knowl-
edge About Groundwater to the Surface in California Water Policy, 38 ENvIRONs ENVTh. L. &
POL'Y J. 191, 198-201 (2015); Murthy, supra note 16, at 219.
" Davis, supra note 73, at 358.
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604; Davis, supra note 73, at 379-82.
7' Davis, supra note 73, at 382-85.
71 See, e.g., Howard, supra note 73, at 132 (noting the inadequacy of statutory mandates as
a substitute for a robust right to water).
71 CAL. WATER CODE §106.3(a)-(b) (2012).
" CAL. WATER CODE §106.3(c) (2012).
[Vol. 53
2018] Infrastructural Exclusion and the Fight for the City 551
tional discussions to address issues of accessibility, affordability,
nondiscrimination, and public engagement.8'
In response to the crises in Flint, Detroit, and throughout Michigan,
state legislators are considering a similar package of bills aimed at assuring
equal access to and affordability of water in the state. House Bill 5101, for
example, declares that "each individual has the right to safe, clean, afforda-
ble, and accessible water for human consumption," and that "all state de-
partments and agencies shall employ all reasonable means to implement this
section," including revisions of existing regulations, the imposition of water
affordability requirements, and other measures.82 But like the California stat-
ute, the proposed bill "does not expand any obligation of the state to provide
water or to require the expenditure of additional resources."83
A common thread across these different legal strategies is the disjunc-
ture between affirmative legal mandates on the one hand, and on the other,
the lack of an administrative regime that can enforce these mandates-and
do so in a way that overcomes the problems of unaccountability, fragmenta-
tion, privatization, and financialization as noted in Part I. This is where the
public utility tradition can offer a valuable complement to these discussions.
Like public utility reformers a century ago, today water access advocates
must develop institutional mechanisms that can effectively and responsively
administer the water infrastructure in an inclusive way. The public utility
tradition suggests two specific institutional design strategies here: first, the
reinvestment in public water utilities and special districts that restore public
control over private and semi-private water systems; and second, the crea-
tion of new administrative bodies empowered to exercise broad oversight
and enforcement authority at a macro level, capable of addressing the exclu-
sionary dynamics described above.
B. Restoring public (and democratic) utilities
One public utility-style response to the problem of exclusionary water
infrastructure is to re-publicize the provision of water. In general, public
provision differs from ordinary private provision in its visibility, control, and
distribution, offering potentially more transparent, accountable, and equita-
bly-distributed goods and services.8 4 Certainly there are budgetary and fiscal
requirements for this approach-state and local governments would need to
generate sufficient revenues to sustain public infrastructure, a bar that many
state and local governments have been unable to meet in recent decades. Yet
some policy analysts suggest that state and municipal bond markets are ro-
81 See generally sources cited in note 73, supra.
82 See H.B. 5101, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015).
83 Id.
" See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATrILE OVER PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 35-36 (2002).
552 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 53
bust and affordable enough to finance these kinds of infrastructure
investments.1
5
Furthermore, even in an era of privatization, there remains a significant
public role in structuring water infrastructure through state-chartered special
districts, utilities, and authorities. But the question in these contexts is
whether and to what extent these quasi-public bodies are themselves ac-
countable and responsive to the public at large. Here we can see a second
implication of the public utility idea. If public utility at its core is about the
accountability of power over infrastructure (see Part II above), and if part of
the problem of water infrastructure today is the unaccountability of public as
well as private actors (see Part I above), then it follows that a modern-day
water utility will have to develop more robust institutions for internal ac-
countability. In Detroit, for example, the Great Lakes Water Authority
(GWLA) took over operations in Eastern Michigan in January 2016, with a
state-appointed board comprised of officials from Detroit and the surround-
ing counties, with authority over rates and capital investment.8 6 But as the
negotiations between Flint and the GWLA continue, it is unclear how re-
sponsive or transparent this new authority will be.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, water dis-
tricts themselves have limited powers and geographic scope, and are there-
fore not obligated to accord voting or participation rights to all residents-
the one-person/one-vote requirement that applies to state and local govern-
ments.8 7 These holdings seem to run counter to a string of precedents ex-
tending the one-person/one-vote requirement to all affected residents of
other state-chartered local bodies that exercised "public functions," such as
school boards.88 Courts have distinguished these different local entities in
terms of the scope of their authority-special districts, according to the
Court, exercise more limited functions and scope of authority and thus need
8 See generally KEVIN DEGOOD, CHRISTIAN WELLER & ANDREW SCHWARTZ, CTR. FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS, AN INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN FOR AMERICA: How INVESTING IN INFRA-
STRUCTURE WILL LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR PROSPERITY, ADVANCE ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS,
AND REBUILD THE MIDDLE CLASS 51-52 (July 2016).
'6 See, e.g., GREAT LAKES WATER AUTHORITY, ABOUT Us, http://www.glwater.org/about-
us/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/G5LJ-NGGC].
87 See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 368 (1981) (declining to extend one-person-one-vote
to Arizona special district due to its merely 'nominal' public status); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728 (1973) (declining to extend one-person,
one-vote to a water storage district because "of its special limited purpose and of the dispro-
portionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group."); Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist.
Management Ass'n, Inc., 158 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 1998). See also Richard Briffault, Who
Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 339
(1993).
" See Kramer v. Union School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969) (requiring ex-
tension of franchise to all residents of a school board area, including those without children);
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968) (extending one-person/one-vote to Texas
Commissioners Court); Fumalaro v. Chicago Board of Education, 566 N.Ed.2d 1283, 1299
(I11. 1990) (requiring one-person/one-vote for all residents in a school system on grounds that
all were affected by the authority of the school board); see generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) (establishing the one-person/one-vote standard).
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not be saddled with the one-person-one-vote requirement. Special districts
thus often have weighted voting schemes instead that allocate vote shares by
property ownership in the districts.
Despite these doctrinal holdings, it is plausible that these districts them-
selves could facilitate greater transparency and democratic accountability in-
ternally. Ostrom herself argued that the creation of special water districts in
Los Angeles would encourage self-organized collective action by members
of these water districts.89 By Ostrom's account, the existence of the district
itself would make it easier for residents to overcome the difficulties of col-
lective action: by providing a formal political structure, special districts
could house greater participation and collaborative governance of water re-
sources.90 But this seems overly optimistic; most water districts are hidden
from residents' view, and in their day-to-day operation relatively opaque.
Even municipal representation of the kind employed by the GWLA, which
allows some form of accountability to member municipalities, is at best a
partial solution. Outside of highly politicized contexts like Flint where water
provision has become a central focal point of local politics, it is unlikely that
these institutions will be subject to robust public engagement and
monitoring.
But states retain the ability to structure these authorities and special
districts however they please. And it is here that the democratic potential of
utilities, authorities, and special districts emerges. Indeed, some scholars
have suggested the need for more flexibility in the types of accountability
required of special districts that go beyond property-based voting, as cur-
rently required for such quasi-governmental bodies.9' In studies of regulatory
capture and failure, administrative law scholars have suggested a range of
institutional designs that can be readily adapted to special districts and water
utilities through state legislation. Some scholars suggest various forms of
consumer, user, or stakeholder representation though advisory bodies, or
through dedicated consumer representative offices;92 these measures could
be easily incorporated into the design of water utilities. Others have sug-
gested processes for policymaking that pro-actively engage stakeholders in
collaborative deliberation, debate, and participation.93
89 OsTRoM, supra note 38, at 133-42.
90 Id.
91 See Thomas Merrill, Direct Voting by Property Owners, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 307
(2010). See also Camille Pannu, Drinking Water and Exclusion: A Case Study from Califor-
nia's Central Valley, 100 CAL. L. REV. 223, 245 (2012) (critiquing the fragmentation and
insulation of water districts). For a similar critique of municipal utility districts in Texas, see
Sara C. Galvan, Wrestling with MUDs to Pin Down the Truth About Special Districts, 75
FORDHAM L. REv. 3041, 3068 (2007).
92 See, e.g., Dan Schwarz, Preventing Regulatory Capture Through Consumer Empower-
ment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOw To Limrr IT 365 (Daniel Carpenter & David
Moss eds., 2013).
93 See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the
Legal Infrastructure for Collaborative Governance, 2010 Wisc. L. REv. 297, 350-56 (2010)
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These measures would help rovide a more visible and empowered in-
stitutional foothold for participation. Indeed, in the past, grassroots participa-
tion in public utility governance had been facilitated by "Citizens' Utility
Boards" (CUBs), which enrolled members through flyers printed on utility
bills by state mandate and operated as third-party monitors of utility policies
and decisions. This practice of requiring utility companies to include the
CUB enrollment flyer on their own printed materials was barred by the Su-
preme Court as a form of impermissible compelled speech.14 CUBs have
since continued to exist in some states as nonprofit advocacy organizations
with varying degrees of formal support such as public funding, and informal
support such as norms of participation in utility policy decisions.95 Institu-
tionalizing stakeholder representation and engagement within the utility it-
self would help overcome these reductions in direct stakeholder influence.
C. Public oversight over the broader water infrastructure
Re-publicizing, and democratizing, water authorities offers one way to
restore public utility-style oversight of the water system and assure more
equitable access. But as the discussion in Part I suggests, modem mecha-
nisms of exclusion involve a range of actors that extend well beyond the
formal boundaries of the water utility itself, however democratized it might
be. The fragmentation of jurisdictions as well as the privatization and
financialization of water systems raise further challenges for the goals of
assuring equity and access. In response to these modern-day challenges,
water equity could be achieved through a variation on the public utility idea:
the establishment of more centralized, and empowered forms of public over-
sight, aimed at the larger domain of water infrastructure broadly construed.
1. The importance of strategic and system-wide public oversight
In some sense, the modem administrative state with its generalized
powers to regulate commerce, provide for consumer protection, and prevent
discrimination is a product of how public utility models led to the main-
streaming and institutionalization of regulatory authority.96 But it is also true
that not all forms of regulatory oversight are equally influential on the larger
dynamics of equality, inclusion, and access to basic goods. As several recent
historical accounts suggest, much of the mid- and late-twentieth century
(proposing language for a new Federal executive order that would prioritize management of
collaborative and participatory processes).
" See Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Com'n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 18
(1986).
" See, e.g., CUB of Minnesota, http://cubminnesota.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/
5PDR-DAH3]; Oregon CUB, https://oregoncub.org/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/E3JY-BBWG]; CUB of Wisconsin, http://www.wiscub.org/about [https://
perma.cc/8NFV-MAHB].
96 See Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism, supra note 44.
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achievement of norms of nondiscrimination and equal access in areas like
healthcare, welfare, and equal employment in fact depended on the creative
and strategic application of regulatory authority in ways that maximized the
larger impact of public oversight to create a more widespread private accept-
ance of these norms.97 Thus, the 20th century establishment of laws and
norms of anti-discrimination and universal access to entitlements like Medi-
care all owe a great deal to the background efforts by administrators to cre-
ate new offices and techniques of oversight, enforcement, and even
organizational cultural change.98 Through strategic use of federal authority
over spending grants,99 and by creating new offices charged with oversight
and monitoring of racial discrimination charges, federal agencies could resist
efforts by state regulators to restrict access to these safety net programs on
the basis of race or ethnicity.100 Similarly, norms of equal employment in
private industry spread in part where federal agencies like the Federal Com-
munications Commission ("FCC") deployed their licensing powers strategi-
cally.1 1 In particular, the FCC began to require internal equal employment
practices on the part of communications firms as a condition for receiving
FCC licenses.0 2 This had a tremendous impact on broader employment prac-
tices as these firms were themselves major employers in the mid-century.103
A full exposition of these rich and revealing historical accounts is be-
yond the scope of this paper, but these examples indicate a key theme: to the
extent that regulatory authorities can exercise control over key "linchpins"
of the modern economy-through control of federal grantmaking to states,
leveraging licensing authorities over economically-significant firms, and the
like, regulators were able to catalyze a much wider ripple effect across the
97 
See, e.g., DAVID BARTON SMITH, THE POWER TO HEAL: CIVIL RIGHTS, MEDICARE, AND
THE STRUGGLE TO TRANSFORM AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 104-40 (2016) (describing
the inner battles between bureaucratic reformers, critics, and the civil rights movement to en-
sure racially nondiscriminatory application of Medicare in what at the time remained a ra-
cially-segregated healthcare system).
98 See id.
" On the use of grants and funding conditions as a key policy tool for federal agencies,
see Eloise Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of the
Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE L. J. 248, 317 (2014). For a critical analysis of how such funding
conditionality could be used to create new entitlements beyond statutory intent and Congres-
sional oversight, see Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Eco-
nomic Rights, 66 DuKE L.J. 1677, 1688 (2017).
100 See SMITH, supra note 97; see also Karen Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Fed-
eralism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825,
863 (2015) (documenting how bureaucrats pioneered rationality-review models of equal pro-
tection through which restrictive state welfare rules were evaluated and often overturned by
federal counterparts in the 1940s and 1950s).
10' See SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW
RIGHT 155-74 (2014)
io2 See id. at 164.
0 See id. at 155-74, 197-203 (exploring the evolution of equal employment rights
through battles over the hiring and promotion practices in regulatory agencies like the Federal
Communications Commission and the Federal Power Commission); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex,
and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96
VA. L. REV. 799, 841 (2010).
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social and economic landscape. Furthermore, by investing in monitoring and
enforcement capacities, these effects could be further expanded and consoli-
dated. In context of water and infrastructural inclusion, this theme suggests
that, as the larger water infrastructure implicates a wider ecosystem of public
and private actors through privatization, financialization, and the fragmenta-
tion of municipal authorities, policies assuring fair and equal access can be
implemented more effectively if regulators can establish leverage over simi-
larly critical "linchpins" in the larger water system. To put it another way,
strategic regulatory enforcement that targets influential firms is more effec-
tive than enforcement regimes which focus on surface-or individual-
level-harms. 04
This view of strategic enforcement suggests the need for specific en-
forcement agencies that are empowered to oversee-and pressure if
needed-a wide range of actors involved in shaping the water infrastructure:
multiple municipal bodies, utilities, state regulators, private providers, and
investors. Indeed, the idea of environmental justice and environmental ra-
cism which informed not only social movements but also the creation of the
Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Environmental Justice
("OEJ") can play an important role here in facilitating more strategic and
macro-level policies to address systematic forms of infrastructural exclu-
sion'05-provided the Office is given more established powers, budgets, and
insulation from political pressure and recurrent attempts to weaken or elimi-
nate it. 106
In addition to strengthening administrative bodies like OEJ, addressing
systematic forms of water exclusion would require more robust regulatory
oversight of private actors that are not themselves directly involved in the
administration of water systems. First, agencies overseeing water equity
would have to address the realities of privatization. Given the realities of
privatization and "government by contract"107 scholars have suggested the
104 This is a key insight that shaped parallel attempts by the Obama Administration's De-
partment of Labor to enforce labor laws in a similarly fragmented and diffuse modem econ-
omy where many workplace policies are set not by the formal employers themselves, but by
"lead firms" who though outsourcing and franchising agreements exercise outsized influence
on the labor practices of a whole sector. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE 222
(2014).
10' On the environmental justice movement and the creation of the Office, see, e.g., Rich-
ard Lazarus, Pursuing 'Environmental Justice': The Distributional Effects of Environmental
Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1992); Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice (February 11, 1994); and LuKE COLE & SHEILA FOSTER, FROM THE
GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2001).
"06 See Talia Buford, Has the Movement for Environmental Justice Been Lost?, PROPUB-
LICA (July 24, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/has-the-moment-for-envi-
ronmental-justice-been-lost [https://perma.cc/M5JM-L8VK] (describing the potential
elimination of the Office for Environmental Justice and its precarious position under the Bush
and Trump administrations).
107 On the larger pattern of privatization and possible solutions to it, see, e.g., GOVERN-
MENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha
Minow eds., 2009).
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implementation of public law standards of accountability through procure-
ment offices and outsourcing contracts. These contracts could, for example,
mandate transparency, public participation, third-party monitoring, and per-
formance benchmarks. These contracts could also include termination or
governmental takeover provisions, reverting the service back to public pro-
vision under conditions to prevent more extreme abuses of power. 108 For this
to work, governments would need to create robust enforcement agencies to
monitor compliance even if the contracts themselves were rewritten along
these lines.
Second, regulatory oversight would have to expand to address the role
of investors and the financialization of water systems. Indeed, it is notable
that one of the key implications of the public utility critique of private power
and concern over infrastructure was precisely such an effort to limit outsized
investor power. After an exhaustive study documenting a hidden oligarchy
of investors who, through holding companies had acquired dominant control
over gas and electric utilities, Congress passed the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA).19 The Act required all holding companies
that owned electric and gas utilities to register with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC"), which in turn was empowered to mandate
where it deemed appropriate restructuring of the corporate ownership struc-
ture. PUHCA was part of the larger Progressive Era ethos attacking concen-
trated private power over public utilities. Unsurprisingly, PUHCA was
controversial when implemented, and though it became institutionalized for
much of the 20th century, it was repealed in 2005.110 PUHCA could be rein-
stituted at the federal level, applied to water utility holding companies, and
extended to private equity investors in water systems."' Requiring greater
transparency of investor ownership of utilities, and simplifying the chain of
ownership, would have a number of benefits: first in making clear who actu-
ally owns the utility and thus who has ultimate responsibility and control for
the utility's actions; and second in reducing potential conflicts of interest and
misaligned incentives that could arise if the utility were held by different
types of investors with other financial stakes.
2. Institutionalizing strategic enforcement
Recall that the public utility idea and public trust concept both operated
as a way to rebalance the power differential between private actors with
'0' See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Joseph C. Dugan, The Human Side of Public-Private Part-
nerships: From New Deal Regulation to Administrative Law Management, 102 IOWA L. REV.
883, 923 (2017); Laura Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT1 BY CON-
TRACT, supra note 107, 335, 336.
109 Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified at 15 USC §§ 79-79z-6 (2016)).
110 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 § 1263 (2005).
l. Cf. Roberta Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a Model for Breaking
Up the Banks That are Too-Big-to-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 821, 856-62 (2011) (describing
the applicability of PUHCA for addressing systemic financial risk).
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control over infrastructure and the public at large. These strategies for moni-
toring the wider water infrastructure would require a similar creation of
dedicated water oversight and enforcement. Formal bodies for "proxy advo-
cacy" such as ombudsmen or dedicated offices charged with advocating for
end users could be valuable in this context.'12 In Michigan, some legislators
have already proposed the creation of citizen-based oversight commissions,
and a "water ombudsmen.""' 3 Notably, the city of Flint has responded to the
water crisis in part by creating a dedicated city "health officer" whose job is
primarily to interface and negotiate with other state-level authorities like the
Michigan DEQ, the state legislature, and special districts to ensure Flint's
concerns were not being overlooked.' " a These are important first steps, but
these offices would need to be made much more powerful and imbued with
greater resources and capacities to employ the kinds of oversight tools sug-
gested above, for example through greater budget allocations and statutory
changes in state law. Such consolidated authority can help overcome
problems of fragmentation and regulatory failure noted in Part I above.'
While new administrative bodies at the state or federal level could be
authorized with such powers, it will also be important that these offices are
themselves democratically accountable. Accountability is crucial to prevent-
ing the regulatory failures of the kind noted in Part I above. But it is also
important that participation be situated in these kinds of bodies that exercise
macro, system-wide authority. Too often, participatory reforms in urban
planning focus on a hyper-local view of participation, such as through com-
munity boards and other local forums. This focus further fragments the ur-
ban polity and cabins participation in bodies that have little influence on the
larger economic structures producing urban inequality."6 A similar problem
arises in context of environmental permitting, which takes place at too small
112 On the general idea of proxy advocacy and dedicated institutional representatives, see
Schwarz, supra note 92, at 366; Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democ-
racy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 491 (2005); Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence
Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDozo L. REV. 53, 55 (2014).
113 See H.R. 4201, 99 Leg. (Mich. 2017) and 4214 § 3102, 99 Leg. (Mich. 2017) (together
proposing creation of a Water Resources Commission with significant representation by mem-
bers of the public); H.R. 4375, 99 Leg. (Mich. 2017) (proposing establishment of a Water
Ombudsman).
114 Interviews with Ford Foundation staff (Nov. 2017). The health officer position was
created last year drawing resources from philanthropic donors like the Ford Foundation to
cover staff salary and administrative costs. This remains an early experiment in direct govern-
ment capacity-building.
115 See also Sabeel Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. I. P, RDIsc. L.
J., (forthcoming 2018) (describing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as an example of
such institutionalized proxy advocacy and institutionalized representation). It should be noted
however, that as the CFPB's experience suggests, this concentration of authority might also
make the body a more visible target for opposing interest groups. The net result is unclear. I
suspect hat the gains to enabling collective action and representation outweigh this heightened
risk of backlash, but this would require further analysis to explore.
116 Authors considering reforms to increase participation by creating hyper local bodies
often miss this flaw. See, e.g., Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. Rv. 1323 (2014).
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a scale and too late in the process to represent genuine community influence
on the larger patterns of environmental inequality."7
One way accountability and participation can be assured in these ex-
panded enforcement authorities would be through proxy advocacy and inter-
est representation of the kind described in Part III.B above.
A second approach would be to engage communities in the process of
enforcement itself. The countervailing power of affected constituencies can
be expanded by providing them with greater points of leverage to assure the
monitoring of environmental harms and enforcement of standards of equal
access. This in turn can help democratize and hold accountable both the
regulators themselves, and the larger water infrastructure. In contrast to par-
ticipation in ex ante permitting or licensing measures such as in the context
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) which creates a process
for reviewing the environmental impact of major development projects, or
through local level zoning decisions, this approach would provide civil soci-
ety actors with greater influence on the ongoing day-to-day governance and
administration of safety and access standards. Concretely, this kind of em-
powered participatory monitoring can be accomplished through policy de-
signs that enable third parties to trigger enforcement and inspection
procedures on the part of regulators, combined with the publication of avail-
able data and metrics on current water and environmental quality."'
In Mumbai, Johannesburg, and other urban areas in the Global South,
where water and urban infrastructure have been placed under severe strain
by economic development, this kind of participatory monitoring has been
key in organizing, power-building, and governance strategy employed by
marginalized communities to make greater claims for environmental justice
and to insert themselves in the governance of urban infrastructure. The
Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI), a global coalition of poor, land-
less residents in particular has pioneered the use of such "pavement census,"
monitoring its own neighborhoods to document inadequacies of urban infra-
structure, and leveraging that as an advocacy tool to pressure local govern-
ments.'19 Similar forms of participatory monitoring have been used to shift
power over local infrastructure and development governance in the United
States as well. Similar strategies were deployed by grassroots organizers
17 Similarly, proponents of hyper-local environmental participation fail to consider this
drawback. Cf Sheila Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land
Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 530-43 (2006) (describing a hyper-local fight to preserve
community gardens).
"'8 On this idea of "citizen audits," See Rahman, supra note 115, and Rahman, From
Civic Tech to Civic Capacity: The Case of Citizen Audits, 50 POL. ScI. & POLITICS 751, 751-52
(2016).
119 On SDI, see XAVIER DE SOUZA BRIGs, DEMOCRACY AS PROBLEM SOLVING: CIVIC
CAPACITY IN COMMUNITIES ACROSS THE GLOBE 91-99 (2008)(documenting the rise of SDI
and its use of such participatory monitoring techniques).
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under the Community Reinvestment Act and during the War on Poverty.12°
More recently, the Partnership for Working Families has worked with cities
like Oakland to create city-chartered oversight bodies in which local repre-
sentatives play a major role in auditing and overseeing major urban develop-
ment projects.12 1 Furthermore, the innovation of new forms of "civic
technology" through the transparency of data and metrics and the rise of
"citizen science" can facilitate this kind of participatory monitoring.122 By
making public data on environmental quality, and by offering a way for
residents to input their own information about on-the-ground infrastructure
conditions, state and local government bureaucracies can become more re-
sponsive to local conditions.
123
IV. CONCLUSION
The tragedy in Flint, Michigan and the larger context of inequality in
access to water points to a deeper pattern of structural injustice, exclusion,
and inequality in the contemporary American political economy. While
much of the public discussion on the inequality crisis focuses on wages,
income, and taxes, the water crisis highlights an often hidden but equally
urgent dimension of inequality, operating through the governance of basic
infrastructure. A combination of bureaucratic failures, fragmented public au-
thorities at the state, local, and federal levels, and the problems of privatiza-
tion and financialization produce systemic forms of exclusion, inhibiting the
ability of many communities to access core infrastructure and goods needed
for survival and well-being. Such infrastructural inequality effectively ex-
cludes communities from full membership in the polity, by undermining the
kinds of basic goods and necessities they can access on free and equal terms,
while maintaining ease of access for other constituencies instead. While this
paper has highlighted these patterns in context of the water crisis, the same
dynamics apply to other kinds of "infrastructure" as well, from the legal
construction of urban and exurban geography, to the administering of other
necessities beyond water, like internet access, access to finance, and access
to housing.
1 24
12 See Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New Governance,
New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEV. L.J. 1, 3 (2010).
121 See Rahman, supra note 115, at Part IV (describing the Partnership for Working Fami-
lies' model for community monitoring and enforcement of developer commitments to local
hiring and neighborhood investment).
122 See, e.g., BETH NOVECK, SMART CITIZENS, SMARTER STATE: THE TECHNOLOGIES OF
EXPERTISE AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNING 6 (2015); Hollie Russon Gilman, The Moment for
Participatory Democracy, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., available at https://ssir.org/articles/
entry/the-moment for_participatory-democracy [https://perma.cc/Y5CY-CZYX].
123 See, e.g., NOVECK, supra note 122; Gilman, supra note 122.
124 For a discussion of inequality and public utility-style solutions in these other contexts
see e.g. Private Power: Public Values, supra note 5; Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship:
[Vol. 53
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However, as the public utility tradition suggests, inclusive governance
of water infrastructures, and others, is possible, through restored public
control and enforcement authorities, and by democratizing those public au-
thorities to make them more responsive and accountable. Indeed, this focus
on infrastructure as a key site for inequality on the one hand and the produc-
tion of equality on the other represents a critical front-line for contemporary
battles over equality, inclusion, and membership. These are needs felt across
racial, gender, urban/rural lines. They represent deep and durable forms of
inequality; addressing them would create an equally transformative shift to
greater equality of opportunity and inclusion.
It should be no surprise then that social movement organizations like
the Partnership for Working Families are beginning to organize around the
concept of infrastructure, using it to link together a multi-racial coalition for
urban and economic justice.125 Like contemporary progressive attempts to
assert the "right to the city," infrastructural inclusion tackles corporate
power, urban injustice, and racial exclusion.12 6 But these ideas of infrastruc-
tural inclusion also transcend the structural fragmentation of the city itself.
Infrastructure also provides a way to address concerns of urban, exurban,
and rural constituencies alike. The ideas for infrastructural inclusion devel-
oped in context of the water crisis thus represent a crucial dimension of
equality advocacy and policymaking-a form of "utility populism" that can
play an important role in addressing current concerns about systemic ine-
quality, racial and gender exclusion, and the erosion of democracy itself.1 27
Exclusion and Inclusion through the Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. R.
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126 See, e.g., Schragger, supra note 3, at 1-5; Harvey, supra note 3; Foster & Jaione, supra
note 41, at 283.
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